

29 APR 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Inspector General's Report of Inspection of the
Near East Division

1. Attached is the Inspector General's report of inspection of the Near East Division containing 80 recommendations.
2. The previous inspection of this division was completed in 25X1A6a [REDACTED] has been made a separate division and [REDACTED] In spite of a net loss in area NE Division has grown in number of employees and allocations of funds. Counting attached Communications, SR and TSD personnel, NE Division numbers about [REDACTED] Its operating budget for FY 1960 is slightly over [REDACTED] FOIAb3b1
3. Probably the greatest deficiencies of NE Division are in the related fields of personnel management and training. No one in the division could be considered an expert on the whole area, and only a handful are expert on any one country. Few of the division's officers have a working knowledge of a Near Eastern language and area knowledge generally is only superficial. These weaknesses are mentioned in several parts of our report, but your particular attention is invited to the sections on "Personnel Management" and "Training" which begin on page 46.
4. Another weakness of long standing is the absence of unilateral intelligence operations. Unfortunately, this weakness is frequently

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of these recommendations and the development of an effective espionage apparatus will require your personal support.

5. In Section II, "Division Management," we have described the division's structure and the diffusion of authority among officers having no direct contact with day-to-day operations. We have recommended instead the establishment of three command areas

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[REDACTED] with operational authority delegated to the chiefs of these units. [REDACTED]

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would continue temporarily as a task force but would ultimately be absorbed by the [REDACTED]. We believe that clearing the command channels will not only improve efficiency but will also improve the morale of second-echelon employees who have heretofore been isolated from policy levels.

6. The most difficult situation we found in the field was in [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This has already been reported to you by memorandum and in Section VII of this report we have discussed the matter further. We [REDACTED]
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have concluded that the operational results in [REDACTED] do not justify the considerable investment, and that there should be a reduction

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of approximately 50 per cent in Agency employees in [redacted] over the
[redacted] 25X1A6a next two years. Specifically, we have recommended that the [redacted]

Operations Base be abolished and that its functions be absorbed by
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the [redacted] We have also recommended increased emphasis

on non-official and unilateral activity. We did not attempt to
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25X1A2d1 assess [redacted] the subsidy to the [redacted], be-
cause of uncertainty over its future.

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7. In addition to the [redacted] we have recom-
mended the dissolution of several other sub-marginal activities in-

25X1A6a [redacted] ibuted
to the accomplishment [redacted] 25X1A1a the Agency's mission and their termination
should save about [redacted] per year.

8. We found that support of the Near Eastern stations has
been as good as could be expected under the circumstances, although
there had been some difficulties with administrative personnel.
The most difficult aspect of support is the logistical problem
which derives from the fact that the area is so remote and so eco-
nomically backward. Other than logistics, Section III of the report
identifies three major support problems: (a) far too many Agency-

25X1C4e [redacted] b) there is a
definite need for clarification of Agency policy with respect to
housing benefits, which now greatly exceed those of the [redacted] 25X1C4a
25X1C4a [redacted] and (c) the lack of medical care at some posts is a
physiological and psychological problem which we must overcome if

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our employees in those areas are to concentrate their full efforts on their jobs. In Section III we have drawn certain conclusions and proposed a complete re-examination of these problems by appropriate DD/P and DD/S components.

9. The most pressing problem in South Asia is the future posture [redacted] 25X1A2d1

in which we have already invested over [redacted]. The various 25X1A1a aspects of this problem are discussed on page 273.

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Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Inspector General

Attachment
(IG's Report of Inspection of
the Near East Division)

cc: DDCI - *initials 1/31/61*
DD/P
C/NE

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